The notion of anti Shi'sm 
Introduction
The recent decades of the twentieth century have witnessed a global raise in the public presence of religion in political life, both in the national and trans-national spheres (Casanova 1994) . This is especially clear among Muslim societies where the turn towards politicized religious identities has been more noticeable in public. The Indonesian political shift from the New Order regime towards democratic rule brought with it the rise of religious attribute in political life with Islamic political parties participating in elections. Instead of formal political institution like Islamic political party, Indonesian democratic era, known as Orde Reformasi, also has been marked by an increase in hard-line Islamist groups and communal violence between religious groups in society. Using government regulation such as Blasphemy Law, some religious groups play role as police of moral and religion. Though, Indonesian constitution guarantees religious freedom as reflected in the country's national motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" which means "Unity in Diversity", but since democracy was introduced in 1998, numerous religious conflicts have come to the front (Human Right Watch 2013) . Whereas these conflicts were repressed by Suharto (1967 Suharto ( -1998 , the new space to maneuver means that in predominantly Sunni-Indonesia conflicts are now erupting with greater intensity.
In the post New Order, there has been remarkable increase in violence against and discrimination of minority group. According to the Jakarta-based Setara Institute, which monitors religious freedom in Indonesia, there have been more than 200 violent attacks a year on religious minorities after 2008. In 2008 there were more than 260 such cases. Shia are the second-most frequently attacked groups, next to Ahmadiyyah, in Sunni majority Indonesia. In particular, Shia Muslims are increasingly being targeted. While there has been passive Sunni-Shia tension in Indonesia, the geopolitical conflict, such as Syrian conflict has made it worse.
Despite rising Sunni-Shia tension, anti-Shia propaganda is growing in social media. To persuade the majority Sunni Muslims of the legitimacy of jihad against Shia, the jihadi groups propagate the anti-Shia narrative that frames the conflict in global level as sectarian one. Framing the war in Syria as a religious conflict, Muslims versus non Muslims, that justify jihad and mobilize people to participate in Shia exclusion. Indeed, in the last few years, various jihadi media have been flooded with anti-Shia propaganda and hate speech. Images, photos, and articles on the infidelity and cruelty of Shia appear daily on various jihadi websites. In those images, photos, articles and other publications, the antiShia narratives, both in local and global nuance, are shared and liked by the antiShia supporters. The anti-Shia narratives which circulate in online media have two main goals, firstly, it gives theological justification for the war by portraying Shia as a deviant belief, which not only taints the purity of Islam but also is hostile to it. Secondly, it frames the Syrian conflict within a broader sectarian war between Sunni and Shia. The narrative goes that right through the history of Islam, the Shia have always tried to destabilize the Sunni caliphate (Nuraniyah, 2014:1) .
In recent time, at least there are three streams that contribute to violent attacks on Indonesia's Shia minority (IPAC 2016) . First, Pro-ISIS extremists have begun to target Shia as they increasingly take cues from ISIS propaganda and exhortations from Indonesian fighters in Syria and Iraq. Second, Saudi-oriented Salafis, following an ultra-puritan strand of Islam, see Shia as a heretical sect (aliran sesat) that must be banned. They have stepped up advocacy efforts against it, using the scenery of international events to warn that Shia are intent on wreaking destruction in Indonesia as they have in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Third, the growing concern of some conservative people in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) about Shi'a recruitment of their members, especially in East Java.
Those streams strengthen each other, particularly in a climate where Islamist civil society has been using democratic space to push the government to assume a greater role in defining Islamic orthodoxy. This pressure over the last decade has led to violence and legal restrictions in Indonesia against the minority religious group such as Ahmadiyyah, but until recently there was less focus on Shia.
The suspicious toward Shia as threat to unity of Indonesia is a bit excessive, since there is no logical reason and also the number of Shia in Indonesia is very small. The Indonesian Shia community is around 2.5 million out of a population of close to 250 million. They are divided into three groups: Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI); Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI); and Organization of Ahlul Bait for Social Support and Education (OASE). IJABI, the largest, was established in 2000. ABI, founded in 2010 and much smaller than IJABI, is dominated by Sayyids (descendants of the Prophet) and religious scholars concerned with jurisprudence; it is more Iranian-oriented in terms of its doctrine and political stance. OASE is the smallest, with a more puritan outlook. Its growing militancy in the wake of antiShia advocacy has strained its relationship with the other two groups that have been careful in the past not to antagonize the Sunni majority (IPAC 2016).
The intensity of the anti-Shia campaign in Indonesia is relatively new, although anti-Shia sentiment is not. Some scholars identified that the Iranian Revolution as the inspiring momentum to the rising of political Shi'ism. The 1979 Iranian Revolution inspired hopes for revolutionary change, particularly among Indonesian students and led to many conversions to Shia, but it also keen government suspicions and spawned a wave of anti-Shia propaganda from Saudi-linked foundations (Zainuddin and Basyar, 2000) . In the mid-1990s, NU conservatives became increasingly concerned about the encroachment of Shia schools into traditional NU strongholds in East Java and tried to mobilize locals against them. As political space for hard-line Islamist groups increased after Soeharto fell, a somewhat uncomfortable tactical anti-Shia alliance emerged between some of the East Java NU leaders and Salafis campaigning on doctrinal grounds for a declaration of Shia as deviant.
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Like the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Syrian conflict drives tension in the Shia-Sunni relation in Indonesia. The propaganda of anti-Shia since the Syrian conflict erupted, however, is qualitatively different because it has the potential for targeted violence both physical and symbolical. The case of Sampang is physical one, whether the growing of anti Shia rhetoric in social media is an example of symbolic violent.
Differ from the past of anti-Shia campaign which based on intellectual arena throughout seminar, polemic in mass media, and book publication which circulated among religious elite and in formal sphere (Zulkifli, 2009: 244-250) , the recent anti Shia campaign is more massive and sporadic involved both elite and laity actor (orang awam). (The Jakarta Post, April, 23, 2014) .
As a minority group, Shia is a victim of majority-minority relation. Though, majority-minority relation is not always in tension, since the two were living side by side and contributed to the religious life in Indonesia, but as to the dynamic of political situation both global and local, the relationship could become worsen. Along with other minority group, Shia community now become the target of exclusion both from intra religious group (Sunni vs Shia) and state policy. Broadly, two dimension of discrimination against religious groups in Indonesia can be identified. The first perpetrators are government officials, state institutions, such as law enforcement agencies, and non-state institutions such as Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), the pre-eminent clerical body. The second is intolerance arising from community groups, particularly religious mass organizations such as antiShia movement.
Anti-Shi'ism : A Definition
The term of anti-Shia conceived as the prejudice against or hatred of Shia Muslims based on their religion and heritage. The term was first defined by Shia Rights Watch in 2011, but has been used in informal research and scholarly articles for decades (Kedourie, 1988) . According to Shia Right Watch (SRW) the term Anti-Shi'ism must be used in regards to crimes against Shia. The term anti-Shi'ism and its derivations suggest a realistic depiction of events and their impact, and recognize the discrimination that targets Shia as a group, solely on the basis of their beliefs. These crimes are serious, unjust acts that threaten the lives and livelihood of Shia community.
Anti-Shi'ism is expressed in different acts and forms including to faith when some religious group consider the Shia to be nonbelievers (Kuffar). This is clear with the fatwa (religious opinion) issued by MUI, for instance in East Java in 2012. Other form of anti Shi'ism is in economic sphere. Shia followers in Saudi Arabia are unable to climb to high level government jobs (Clarkson, 2014) . Another anti-Shi'sim found in social sphere, for instance occurs in Malaysia where Shia excluded from participation in mainstream society (Shanaan, 2014) . Anti shi'sim also expressed in social relation where, in some parts of the world, Shia are treated as second-class citizens and they restricted to access their right in politic, education and culture.
Discussion
The Rise of Anti-Shi'sm in Indonesia
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 yielded enthusiasm of Indonesia Muslims society with the rise a kind of religious revivalism among university students. The revolution, for some, inspired an outline to wage an Islamic revolution at home. At the same time, however, it also sprouted up antipathy that led to an anti-Shia backlash. This occurs among government who perceives the Iranian revolution could inspire the same spirit in Indonesia. The government, concerned about lessons Indonesians might draw from the successful removal of a dictator, moved to warn people against Shi'ism and step up surveillance of those considered sympathetic to the revolution. Instead of government, some Sunni organizations also reacted by refuting Shia doctrine and suggesting it was heretical.
Although the differentiation of the Shiite and Sunni sects dates back to the earliest days of Islam, the political salience of sectarian identity has varied dramatically over the course of history. In Indonesia the Sunni Shia tension is relatively new. Even though the dispute have been exist since period of process of islamization. The anti-Shi'ism tends to escalate along with the political tension both in geopolitical and national level. Two geopolitical condition escalate Sunni Shia tension in Indonesia are the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the recent Syrian conflict erupted in 2011. These conflicts framed by government and some Sunni groups as Sunni Shia conflict which then accelerate anti-Shia sentiment in Indonesia.
Anti-Shia Campaign
Anti-Shia campaign expressed in many forms and activities. Since the development of information technology, the anti-Shia campaigns occur, both in conventional and non conventional methods. By the conventional method, I mean that the propagation conducted in general forms and activities such as preaching, publishing article and book etc. This method also called conventional in term of Sociological sense that employ physical interaction. For the conventional method, I refer to Zulkifli's four ways of Anti Shi'ism (Zulkifli, 2009) . Meanwhile, in non conventional way, the anti-Shia is perceived as part of development of information technology where the propagation taking place in social media. The social media is a tool to spread and share massages and material contain anti Shia sentiment. In conventional ways at least there are four ways of antiShia campaign. This include seminars, discussions, appeals to government authorities and preaching. (Zulkifli, 2009) . As a response to the spreading of Shia literature, some anti-Shia figures also published anti-Shia writings. The publication is intended to compete with the growing number of Shia works in the market place, particularly those translated from Arabic, English and Persian originals. Anti-Shia literature offered a strong rejection of Shia and its teachings and drew upon both textual and rational proofs. Most of the literatures were translation from famous Arabic originals works. Two of the scholars were very famous as anti-Shia ulama: Muhibb al-Din al- Khatib (1886 -1969 ) and Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (d. 1987 . AlKhatib was born in Damascus and from 1920 took up permanent residence in Cairo, where he became one of the most resolute advocates of Wahhabism. This was a direct result of the influence of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1323) during his education. Al-Khatib was a journalist, commentator, editor and publisher of his own periodicals, al-Zahra (1924 ( -1929 ( ) and al-Fath (1926 ( -1948 with different types of publications, ranging from pamphlets to voluminous works, and with tones from provocative to more moderate. The most important of these might be As-Salus's Ensiklopedi Sunnah-Syiah (Sunni-Shia Encyclopaedia) originally consisting of four volumes in Arabic. This encyclopedia was praised in an introductory note by Muhammad Hidayat Nurwahid, the current spokesman of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly and prominent leader of PKS. Nurwahid, who is known to have a negative attitude towards Shia, claims that it is a "serious and scientific work, which can amplify the scarcity of authoritative literature on Shia." (Nurwahid 2001: xii) .
Those literatures contain negative views on Shia. Two general, but related, points can be drawn from their contents. Firstly, emphasis is placed on controversies between the two madhabs, but with no intention of providing rapprochement. Secondly, the main issues of these controversies remain the same as those of past disputes. These literature could be summarized as the disagreement of Sunni interpretations on Shi'ism: 1) the Qur'an, Shia interpretations and alleged distortion (tahrif) of its text, 2) the authenticity and Shia view of Hadith, 3) the Shia view of the Prophet's companions, 4) the history and Shia concept of the imamate, 5) Shia legal norms, in particular regarding mut'a, 6) the Shia teaching of taqiyya and 7) certain Shia religious rituals (Ende, 1990 : 221-222 cited in Zulkifli 2009 ). In addition to the translation, the reformist Muslim groups also publish their own anti-Shia writings which published in booklets. A large number of articles are to be found in Al-Muslimun of Bangil; from September 1979 to January 1998 there were 32 titles of anti-Shia articles published in this reformist magazine, which is the largest number to appear in the existing Islamic periodicals. Besides, polemical works in the national media indicate a dynamic opposition to the Shia in the country.
The latest book on anti-Shia propagation is Mengenal dan Mewaspadai Penyimpangan
Syi'ah di Indonesia (Identifying and Keeping on Guard against Shia Indonesia) (TIM Penulis MUI Pusat, 2013). This book written by the MUI team (Tim Penulis MUI Pusat). This book is distributed freely as stated in the cover "tidak diperjual belikan". This book look like a compilation from several articles topic on Shia from history of Shia Rafidhah, the fallacy of Shia doctrine, Shia movement and its spreading in Indonesia, and the last chapter is the MUI responses on Shia. Similar to the previous book, this one also be perceived as anti Shia campaign.
The second method of anti-Shia campaign is seminar, discussions and debates concerning Shia and SunniShia relations. Unlike book publication, these activities of anti Shia campaign are more open to public. The seminars and discussion are carried out in a framework of Islamic dawa rather than intellectual discussion. For this it is necessary to mention some seminars that marked the anti Shia campaign.
There are two popular seminars that attracted public attention and considerable media interest. The first was the "Seminar on Islamic Doctrine" organized in Jakarta's Hotel Indonesia on 14 January 1988 by the Middle East Alumni of Jakarta. It can be seen as a counter-action to a similar activity held in Jakarta about a month earlier, on 8 December 1987, at which all the speakers were famous liberal thinkers and 'enemies' of the reformist groups and of DDII in particular. The speakers event included Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, and Abdurrahman Wahid. For the anti-Shia group, this seminar was intended to contribute to the spread of Shia in the country. The controversial anti-Shia seminar in question involved three main speakers, M. Rasjidi, Ibrahim Hosen and Fuad M. Fakhruddin, who all agreed that Shi'ism was the main cause of the Iran-Iraq war. They also agreed on the danger of Shia for the Indonesian nation. The goal of the seminar was to confirm Shia as a heterodox sect, and in the framework of da'wa the participants were each given four anti-Shia books, consisting of Indonesian translations of Middle Eastern works by Said Hawa, al-Tunsawi, al-Khatib and Zahir. Abdul Malik M. Aliun, Chairman of the seminar's organizing committee said that "the Middle East alumni think it necessary to correct Islamic doctrine from false streams, one of which is Shi'ism, and we the Muslim umma need to know Shia in order not to be plunged into sin" (Zulkifli, 2009 ).
His opinion provoked angry reactions from the more moderate participants at the seminar, including Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Alwi Shihab. Following the seminar, no less than six critics wrote articles that were published in the national magazine, Tempo responding in particular to Fakhruddin's statement that "'Ali bin Abi Talib tried to satisfy his personal ambition for the caliphate and therefore he was not Islamic". These critics, including Alwi Shihab, could see that this would be provocative to both Sunnis and Shia because of the undoubted personal quality of 'Ali and the prohibition on discrediting one of the four rightly guided Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius Vol. 16 No. 1 caliphs. In his response to Alwi Shihab, Fakhruddin maintained his stand.
The second anti-Shia seminar held on 1997. This seminar took place in the hall of the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta. It was organized by LPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, Institute of Islamic Studies and Research) in collaboration with Gema, a bulletin of the reformist Al-Irsyad. LPPI is led by Amin Djamaluddin, who claims to have been a student of Natsir. As a DDII activist receiving a monthly allowance from that organization, Djamaluddin has a vested interest in blocking the development of religious currents considered false. It also demonstrates the link between LPPI and DDII and their collaboration in the organization of da'wa activities. The importance of this 1997 anti-Shia seminar lies in its success, not only in having as its speakers several Muslim leaders representing great Islamic organizations and institutions in the country. Among them was K.H. Hasan Basri (1920 Basri ( -1998 the then General Chairman of MUI, who delivered the opening speech to the seminar. The large number of participants included state officials, military personnel, 'ulama, Muslim leaders, leaders of Islamic organizations and 'ordinary' people. The seminar was widely reported and became the source of a long-running controversy in the Indonesian media.
Following the previous two methods, the anti-Shia propagation also directed to government. One example of the anti-Shia approach to the government was conducted by asking for the activation of the LPPI seminar recommendations. About a month after the seminar had taken place, LPPI wrote a letter, signed on 17 October 1997, requesting that the government -in this case the Attorney General, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Education and Culture and the Minister of Religious Affairs -forbid the existence of Shia in Indonesia. The group also called a press conference, after which 15 Islamic leaders, including the LPPI director, Amin Djamaluddin and speakers from the seminar went to the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Religious Affairs to present the same request. In the previous year, LPPI had also sent the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Chairman of MUI a similar appeal for the prohibition of Shia Islam in the country. The Indonesian government failed to respond to either request. The campaign for the banning of Shia in Indonesia continued. It became particularly strong following MUI's issuance of the fatwa prohibiting the practice of mut'a. Working towards its goal of ridding Indonesia of Shia, LPPI distributed a leaflet, and urged MUI to issue a fatwa, on the falsity of Shia and to endorse the prohibition of its spread in the country. Despite this request, MUI did not issue a fatwa, stating that its 1984 recommendation had been sufficient (Zulkifli, 2009 ).
The last method of anti Shi'ism as studied by Zulkifli is preaching. Comparing to the previous methods of anti-Shi'ism this is most common to the anti-Shia campaign as well as for the society in general. In this regard, the anti-Shia figures throughout the country include the charge of the falsity of Shia as a topic in their sermons at mosques and other venues. An example for this method is reported by Wisananingrum when, in 1991, she witnessed a leader of MUI give a sermon on the falsity of Shia at the Al-Muslimun Mosque in Bandung. She believes such actions to be a part of the antiShia propagation aimed at persuading the Sunni Muslim community to reject the teachings of Shia (Wisananingrum in Zulkifli, 2009) . A number of anti-Shia sermons were also delivered at the DDII mosque in Jakarta. Furthermore, similar sermons were broadcast though radio stations such as At-Thohiriyah FM in Jakarta, which produced a program about 'false currents'.
Those four methods of antiShia propagations were directed to all segments of the community and state, the laity and the elite. In the eyes of the antiShia movement, not only are the Sunni community members to be protected from the influence of Shia teachings, but the Indonesian government is expected to take a decision on the prohibition of Shia in the country. The attempts by the Sunni reformist group to protect their community from the influence of Shi'ism and to prohibit the madhhab has inevitably led to high tension between the two groupings. Shia figures in Indonesia recount many bitter experiences from negative reactions from the anti-Shia group. These reactions were directed not only to individuals but also to institutions and they varied in their roughness.
The Establishment of National Alliance of Anti-Shia
In preference to the four ways of anti-Shia propagation, the anti-Shi'ism entered new development with the emergence of Aliansi Nasional Anti Shia (National Alliance of Anti Shia), known as ANAS. With the establishment of this alliance, the anti-Shi'ism transforms to more organized and systematic strategy with wide networking. This alliance also put Shia issues as the only target of the campaign. It is worth to mention that ANAS is not a mainstream religious group such as NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, but with its skill in issuing on Shia in media, this Alliance is very influential in public opinion. (Farida and Syarif, 2013) . Formally, the FUUI was founded in 2001 by a Bandung-based kiai named Athian Ali, it focused on countering liberalism, Christianization (kristenisasi), apostasy (pemurtadan) and deviant sects. The organization is probably best known for having in 2002 imposed a death sentence on Ulil Abshar Abdalla, founder of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL).
Athian Ali is a deeply conservative activist with ties across the Islamic organizational spectrum and close relations with local politicians, most recently demonstrated when he was asked to give a lecture before the solar eclipse at Bandung's largest mosque in the presence of the West Java governor (IPAC interview, Athian Ali, Bandung, 19 January 2016). As hard-line coalitions gained ground after Reformasi, Athian's name kept appearing as part of an interlocking directorate of organizations whose members were involved in protesting the construction of churches, preventing Christian gatherings, attacking Ahmadiyah property and taking part in anti-vice raids, in some cases, in partnership with local police and often accompanied by low-level vigilante violence. He did not lead trends as much as follow them and seemed to have an unerring instinct for how to take issues Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius Vol. 16 No. 1 that had attracted public interest and mobilize mass protests around them.
Until the Sampang issue arose, Shia had not been a particular preoccupation because it was not in the public attention, though Athian Ali was personally close to several anti-Shia Persis leaders and also had a longstanding antipathy to Jalaluddin Rakhmat. He kept an eye on the development of Shia in Bandung but only took action after January 2012, when he received a visit from 27 East Java clerics who had come to lobby MUI to ban Shia in the wake of the Madura violence. On 28 February 2012, FUUI agreed to formulate a fatwa on Shia (https://fuuina. wordpress.com/2014/07/01/maklumatfuu-indonesia-tentang-pemilihanpresiden-9-juli-2014/, didownload 23 Feb 2017).
FUUI then organized an expert meeting from17 to 22 March, with a team consisting of Amin Djamaluddin from LPPI, Daud Rasyid and Hartono Ahmad Jaiz from DDII and Luthfi Bashori from NU Garis Lurus (Straight Line). They drafted a fatwa declaring Shia to be "deviant and promoting deviancy (sesat dan menyesatkan)". The fatwa was issued on 22 April 2012 during FUUI's second national congress, attended by the West Java governor and by prominent ulama from both reformist and traditionalist camps.
Branches sprang up around the country but mostly in places where hardline clerics already had a strong political presence, as in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Bogor and Purwakarta in West Java, Probolinggo in East Java, and Balikpapan in East Kalimantan. As of February 2016, ANAS was preparing to establish more branches in so-called "Shia-prone" cities, particularly in Sumatra. According to Athian Ali, ANAS was not concerned with areas where a strong anti-Shia movement was already active, as it was in East Java. Instead it was focusing on regions facing rapid development of Shia communities that lacked Sunni resistance, for example in Pekanbaru and Medan where he said many Shia immigrants from Afghanistan and Iraq were trying to promote Shia.
Most of the groups and individuals that joined ANAS had been previously involved in anti-Shia or anti-Ahmadi campaigns before. ANAS appointed people like Ahmad Zein Alkaf (the leader of the Surabaya-based al-Bayyinat and member of NU's regional advisory board), Farid Okbah, and Said Abdussamad (leader of LPPI Makassar) as members of its advisory board. ANAS also gave the leadership position of its new branches to locally influential clerics.
The significant point to the establishment of ANAS lays in its role as an organized anti-Shia movement. Unlike the previous anti-Shia propagation which conducted partially, the ANAS locates Shia as the only target of their campaign.
Conclusion
Anti-Shi'ism in Indonesia related constantly to geopolitical conflict. In the previous, it was related with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and now links to the Syrian conflict. Some cases show that the sentiment is changing from personal rivalries, political interests and international developments, overlaid by the constant of Salafi antipathy. Unlike in the Middle East, the anti-Shi'ism in Indonesia Sunni-Shia conflict is rare, but now increase rapidly after the Reformation era. The methods of AntiShi'sim, as prejudice based on religious belief, evolves from stigmatization -as expressed in seminar, book publication, and preaching-to violation and exclusion of Shia congregation. The transition of democracy opened up space for the hard-line groups to demand enforcement of religious orthodoxy, though, the anti-Shi'sm has reached new levels with implementation of information technology, where the campaign takes new technology in spreading massage. Channeling the social media, the present anti-Shi'ism sentiment involves both religious elite and laity. The establishment of National of Anti-Shia Alliance or Aliansi Nasional Anti Shia (ANAS) marks the development of anti-Shi'ism to more organized and systematized method in spreading anti-Shia campaign. Using its alliance and networking of the antiShia rhetoric of hard-line advocacy organizations creates an atmosphere that makes extremist violence more likely. Through its campaign, ANAS puts Shia community more in the public consciousness, and it opens the possibility that the issue will spread widely covering theological, social, and political sphere.
